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Abstract
This article examines the impact of European integration on higher education policies of
the Netherlands, Belgium=Flanders and Germany. The analysis of higher education policies in
the three countries is part of a broader project, which focuses on a majority of E.U. member
states. The selection of the three countries for this paper is not based on any methodological
considerations. The question addressed is if higher education policies of member states are
converging, diverging or not changing at all, and whether such developments are a consequence
of the policies of the European Union (E.U.) or of other factors (e.g., the globalization of the
market or of institutions imitating each other). A preliminary assessment leads to the conclusion
that a number of important indications of convergence are present in national policy arrangements
in the 4eld of higher education (in particular student mobility and quality assurance, but less in
the structure of higher education systems My attention will be focused on the structure of higher
education systems, on quality assurance and on student and teacher mobility. These domains
appear to cover most relevant issues pertaining to higher education policies in the European Union
member states (funding of higher education is sometimes considered as a separate domain, but it
can also be regarded as an element of the structure of higher education systems, while it is also
related to the issue of quality assurance).). The European Union, however, does not have much
legal authority in the policy sector in question. Thus, an explanation for converging national
policies may lie elsewhere, in part in the concept of “institutional isomorphism”. c© 2001
International Association of Universities. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Terminological distinctions
What impact does European integration have on the higher education policies of Ger-
many, the Netherlands and Belgium=Flanders? 1 To answer this question, this article
1 After the federalization of Belgium in 1989, higher education policies were almost completely transferred
to the regional level and the level of the language communities. The focus will be on higher education in
Flanders, treating it as a part of the Belgian system before 1989.
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will assess whether the higher education policies of these three countries were converg-
ing, diverging or unchanging? The part, clari4es relevant concepts, such as diversity,
divergence and convergence. In the second, develops the hypothesis that a convergence
of policies is to be expected in E.U. member states and sets out reasons for this ex-
pectation. The third develops a “general scheme” to explain convergence mechanisms.
Marker events in higher education policy at the Union level are chronologically re-
viewed in part 4. Corresponding events in the three member states are analyzed in
part 5. Finally, concluding remarks in the context of the central issue, namely, the
essential mechanism of institutional isomorphism are made.
A substantial body of literature in higher education deals with convergence=divergence
(homogeneity=diversity 2 ) at the level of higher education institutions and at the level
of disciplines. Birnbaum (1983) distinguishes two forms of diversity: external diver-
sity, based on diEerences among higher education institutions, and internal diversity
– diEerences within higher education institutions. This article concentrates on a third
form of diversity, on diEerences among higher education policies. The term I will use
for it will be diversity policy in systems.
Changes to one form of diversity can be accompanied by changes in another form
of diversity in the opposite direction. For example, divergence among higher education
institutions within a higher education system can be the result of converging policies
at the systems level. For instance, E.U. policies to promote diversity can lead to con-
vergence at the systems level (the E.U. member states adopt similar policies aimed at
the promotion of diversity) which may result in divergence at the institutional level of
higher education within member states. Secondly, convergence among higher education
institutions within a system (external convergence) may result from diverging policies
at the policy systems level. For example, diEerent policies of stipulated governments
can result in higher education institutions becoming less diversi4ed.
This complicated relationship between convergence and divergence warns us not to
confuse convergence or divergence among higher education institutions (or even within
a higher education institution) with the same phenomena at the systems level, i.e. with
higher education policies. Thus, the present convergence or divergence is contingent
upon the level of aggregation (e.g., divergence may take place at institutional level,
whereas convergence may be observed at the systems level).
To clarify these distinctions, three inFuential perspectives on the question of diversity=
homogeneity and divergence=convergence in higher education will be examined. The
4rst, internal perspective, is explored by Burton Clark; the second, policy system per-
spective, was analyzed by Guy Neave, and the third, mainly external perspective, draws
on the writings of Frans van Vught. 3
Clark (1996) focused on the internal perspective, which emphasized the basic unit in
higher education institutions, i.e. the academic discipline. He regarded diEerentiation as
2 I will use the terms homogeneity=diversity to denote a particular (static) state of aEairs, whereas
convergence=divergence and homogenization=diversi4cation (or diEerentiation) will be employed to denote a
particular process, i.e. a dynamics. For an extensive review of these concepts, consult Huisman (1995).
3 My discussion of the three perspectives of Clark, Neave and Van Vught, does not suggest that these
authors are somehow proponents of the three perspectives. They did not suggest that any one of the three
is the only right or most important one.
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a natural process in higher education (“the creation of 4nely distinguished subcultures in
academia is a natural process” (Clark, 1996, p. 19).) 4 Clark remarked on “balkanized
authority” in higher education (Clark, 1996, p. 20) Thus:
: : : higher education is a diEerentiating society par excellence. It adjusts internally to
increasing arrays of input demands and output connections by greater specialization
in its production units and the programs they oEer. Adapting to the changing contours
of rapidly expanding and highly specialized knowledge, it creates more varied types
of academic tribes: : : : Higher education is preeminently an internationally shaped
component of modern and modernizing societies: : : : The dynamic of diEerentiation
is a powerful root cause of the tendency for higher education to be a self-guiding
society. Governments and other patrons will increasingly 4nd higher education to be
a contentious area highly resistant to command and control (Clark, 1996, p. 24).
Clark explains apparent convergence processes, by arguing that what we interpret as
convergence is, in fact, divergence along a continuum:
Academic drift is a converging form of drift; second and third sectors of institu-
tions converge on a 4rst sector as they seek to emulate its ways and to gain similar
power and prestige: : : : They only achieve ‘weak emulation’. Individually the emu-
lating institutions add to diEerentiation as they become variously sorted out along a
continuum of degrees of diEerence (Clark, 1996, p. 23).
Neave (1996) concentrated on the systems level. His attention lay in higher education
policies, in particular to the national and supranational policy levels. The “European
dimension” has to be taken into account seriously in research on higher education
policies of its member states, “even if it is not entirely clear at present how it bears
upon the issue of convergence versus divergence” (Neave, 1996, p. 29).
Elsewhere, Neave believes that E.U. policies do result in convergence among national
higher education policies:
There can be little doubt of the inFuence the European Commission is already exert-
ing at establishment level and, no less important, as a force for convergence between
systems (Neave, 1996, p. 31).
The ‘European dimension’—or what is termed as ‘Community level’ action in the
inimitable jargon of Brussels—is explicitly constructed around the ultimate aim of
economic, 4nancial and industrial integration in which convergence stands as the
highway leading to this ultimate goal. These three areas of activity cannot, unless
one believes in the convenient legend of the university as an ivory tower, but move
higher education systems in the member states towards a similar condition (Neave,
1996, p. 38).
However, Neave was also well aware of the diJculties in assessing whether conver-
gence or divergence are involved:
4 For a more elaborate statement of Clark’s position, see Clark (1983).
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In eEect, the perception we have of a particular system and a fortiori of whether
it is diverging or converging is largely a function of where we focus our attention.
Like the Cheshire Cat, sometimes we see a tail, sometimes a head and sometimes
just the grin (Neave, 1996, p. 28).
: : :homogeneity, convergence, diversity and variety are not absolutes. They are
temporary and unstable conditions which always bear watching and, for that rea-
son, will always be part of the warp and weft to our 4elds of enquiry (Neave, 1996,
p. 39).
Van Vught’s (1996) explanatory framework derived from three theoretical perspectives
grounded in organizational theory: the population ecology perspective, the resource de-
pendency perspective and the institutional isomorphism perspective (Van Vught, 1996,
p. 43). He focused on the environments (primarily governments) in which higher ed-
ucation institutions operate, as well as on academic norms and values (i.e. academic
culture):
The various empirical studies appear to underline the notions of the theoretical frame-
work presented earlier. According to the authors of these studies, environmental
pressures (especially governmental regulation) as well as the dominance of aca-
demic norms and values (especially academic conservatism) are the crucial factors
that inFuence the processes of diEerentiation and dediEerentiation in higher education
systems. In all cases, the empirical observations point in the direction of dediEeren-
tiation and decreasing levels of diversity. The overall impression is that, in empirical
reality, the combination of strict and uniform governmental policies and the predom-
inance of academic norms and values leads to homogenization (Van Vught, 1996,
p. 56).
All three approaches insist on change. Thus, they attempt to establish if there is con-
vergence or divergence in the 4eld of higher education. However, each concentrates on
diEerent levels of analysis. Clark primarily focuses on academic disciplines, i.e. on in-
ternal diversity. Neave’s interest is mostly directed toward (national and supranational)
policies, i.e. toward policy system diversity. Van Vught deals mostly with developments
within higher education systems, i.e. with external diversity. Clark observed divergence,
Neave and van Vught mostly convergence (though with reservations). Since the three
approaches deal with diEerent levels of analysis, they are not mutually exclusive. It is,
possible for instance, for divergence to take place at the level of academic discipline,
while convergence occurs simultaneously at the institutional level within a system and
among systems. In this analysis (which focuses on the systems level), these distinctions
are relevant. National policies may be inFuenced not only by E.U. policies, but also
by higher education institutions and developments at the discipline level (eEectively,
academic norms and values).
Finally, convergence and divergence in our domain can apply to policy statements,
policy ends, as well as to the means by which they are achieved. For instance,
the acceptance of legislation does not necessarily imply its implementation. Conver-
gence ought to be observed in such a case, however, even if it is limited to policy
statements.
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2. The hypothesis
What are the causes of convergence or divergence? One of the dilemmas of students
of convergence=divergence in the E.U. is whether an increase in similarities between
member states Fows from Europeanization or from a broader process of globalization. 5
It is an extremely complex issue and its solution is therefore diJcult. However, that
it is not essential, because the eEects on convergence=divergence of the processes of
Europeanization and globalization are generally identical. Europeanization and glob-
alization as processes work in the same direction. They undermine the centrality of
the nation state. Olsen (1997) argued that the policies of the E.U. are large scale and
heterogenous, and that few shared moral and causal beliefs exist in such policies. Such
an absence of normative and cognitive integration diminishes informal, cultural coordi-
nation, and increases the relevance of market exchange and legal rules 6 (Olsen, 1997,
p. 170).
From the perspective of normative political theory, Olsen implies the replacement of
communitarian morality (in which the community is the central unit of morality) with
another form of morality, based on the centrality of market competition. Communitarian
morality frequently manifests itself as national solidarity. National solidarity implies,
among others, the concept that wealth ought to be redistributed along the community’s
boundaries, i.e. along the boundaries of the nation states, instead of the boundaries of
larger units, such as the E.U. In the absence of what for nation states is a characteristic
communitarian solidarity (which oEsets the undesirable eEects of the market through a
redistribution of wealth), the principle, increasingly pronounced at the European level
is competition. Competition is also one of the essential features of globalization. Hence,
the eEects of globalization and European integration are in that sense, similar.
The consequences for convergence=divergence are the following. Increased competi-
tion may result both in diEerentiation and in dediEerentiation of the entities in question.
The former result comes from the relevant entities 4nding their “niches”, whereas the
latter result aEects those entities that cannot adapt to the environment, failing to sur-
vive. 7 That European integration and globalization may result both in diEerentiation
and in dediEerentiation of the policies of E.U. member states, will be more straight-
forward if observed from the perspective of these policies. From that perspective, E.U.
member states are exposed to an increasingly homogenous environment. Homogeniza-
tion is an eEect of Europeanization=globalization. That all E.U. member states are
exposed to increasingly similar environmental conditions leads one to predict a con-
vergence of higher education policies, and convergence at the institutional level.
5 My use of the term “broader” is not intended to suggest that Europeanization is a trend which is only part
of the process of globalization. My use of the term globalization refers to a relatively recent development,
related to the fall of the state-socialist bloc and to an increasingly important role of global competition and
the institutions that accompany it (such as multinationals). Europeanization is a process that started earlier
and can be related to the development of the European Community or even to much earlier examples of
European solidarity (e.g., the role of the Crusades against the Ottoman threat)
6 It should be noted, however, that the ideology of the market is a type of moral belief itself.
7 For a clari4cation of the concepts of diEerentiation and dediEerentiation as its opposite, see again Huis-
man (1995, pp. 13–52).
230 V. Rakic /Higher Education Policy 14 (2001) 225–240
One may hypothesize that Europeanization and globalization will both have the
same e5ect on policy change in the E.U. member states, and that this e5ect will result
in policy convergence. The hypothesis is based on the proposition that Europeanization=
globalization will expose member states to an increasingly homogenous environment.
This increasingly homogenous environment sets oE the impact of European integra-
tion on the policies of member states from issues of natural selection in the world of
biology. 8 The evolution of organisms, is not marked by convergence resulting from
their increased exposure to more similar environmental conditions. Europeanization and
globalization, however, do expose the policies of E.U. member states to an increasingly
homogenous environment. 9
Further essential diEerence between natural selection in the world of organizations=
institutions and in the world of biology resides in the former process involving more
or less rational individuals. Biological theories of natural selection, by contrast, do not
assume that selection processes take place according to a rational plan. In biology,
a dynamic exists between survival strategies of speci4c individuals and of species.
Similarly, organizations demonstrate a survival tendency, whereas individuals attempt
to survive within these organizations. The diEerence between organisms and individ-
uals within organizations is that the former generally do not employ rational survival
mechanisms (human beings are an exception), which implies that species also do not
survive on the basis of rational actions. Individuals within organizations and institu-
tions, have recourse to survival strategies, that are more or less rational which implies
that organizations do survive on the basis of rational action.
This has implications for the issue of convergence=divergence in policies (E.U. mem-
ber states). Policy makers are aware of increasing European integration. They expect
a slow, but steady homogenization in the European Union. Hence, they will attempt
to adopt policies that will not isolate their country from others in a particular policy
domain. Neave ranged this type of behavior under the rubric of “the law of anticipated
results” (Neave, 1996, pp. 29–30). Its upshot is to blur diEerences in policies, that is,
convergence.
There are also factors which inhibit convergence. A high degree of institutionalization
in a policy 4eld will predictably inhibit the process of convergence, just as internation-
alization will induce them. Higher education is just such a 4eld—more institutionalized,
but less internationalized than many others in the European Union. 10 This does not
imply, however, that policy divergence or a static situation will result. It only means
8 For an understanding of the link between organizational theory and theories in the domain of biology,
Hannan and Freeman (1989), Hawley (1986) and Huisman (1995) can be instructive. Consult also Pianka
(1974).
9 Europeanization=globalization may also result in member states perceiving the environment as increas-
ingly homogenous. Such a perception will presumably lead to similar policy responses in the member states
and thus to similar outcomes (i.e., convergence), especially if the causes of environmental homogeneity are
interpreted similarly.
10 “Less internationalized” does not mean there are typically national academic disciplines. Higher education
as a policy sector in the member states of the E.U. is characterized less by international dependence than
other policy sectors (e.g., environmental policy).
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that in higher education policies processes of convergence may be less pronounced
than in other policy 4elds. Convergence, then remains our predicted outcome.
Thus, the exposure of higher education policies of E.U. member states to increas-
ingly homogenous environmental conditions, combined with the fact that rational policy
makers will apply survival strategies for their organizations and themselves in keeping
with the “law of anticipated results” (the anticipated result is an increasingly similar
European environment), will lead to convergence. The hypothesis is higher education
policies in the member states of the E.U. will tend toward convergence.
3. A general scheme
What might be the possible mechanisms of convergence In principle, convergence
in national higher education policies may Fow from
(a) reactions by E.U. member states to policies of European institutions (the activities
of the Commission and the European Court of Justice are particularly relevant);
(b) developments at the institutional level in individual E.U. member states, as well as
developments at the level of academic disciplines;
(c) mutual inFuence of policies upon and by individual E.U. member states.
Hence, reasons for convergence may rest on:
(a) E.U.-related coercion and an awareness of the bene4ts of abiding by E.U. deci-
sions; 11
(b) an insight into the bene4ts of accommodating to institutional changes within na-
tional higher education systems, as well as an appreciation of the bene4ts of ac-
commodating to developments inside academic disciplines;
(c) imitation and member state-related coercion (i.e., one state pressing another into
accepting a particular policy).
E.U.-related coercion and member state-related coercion, as well as insights into the
bene4ts of abiding by particular E.U. decisions or of accommodating to developments
at the level of higher education institutions or academic disciplines, can be regrouped as
motivations guided by self-interest. Imitation may spring from rational self-interest, as
well as from “self-prescription”, which includes non-calculative imitation of authority
and non-calculative imitation of a numerically dominant example (fashion is frequently
an instance of the latter type of behavior).
3.1. General scheme
Amongst possible reasons for convergence of national higher education policies in
E.U. member states seen from the perspective of national policy-makers 12 are:
11 In the latter case we deal with bene4ts less related to coercion.
12 Divergence, on the other hand, can be a result of an absence of coercion at the European level, but also
of individual E.U. member states reacting diEerently to E.U. legislation.
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3.1.1. Self-interest
(1) Coercion:
(a) by E.U. institutions,
(b) by other member states.
(2) Self-interested behavior unrelated to coercion:
(a) bene4ts anticipated by responding to E.U. policies,
(b) bene4ts deriving from developments at the institutional level,
(c) bene4ts related to developments at the discipline level,
(d) calculative imitation of other policies. 13
3.1.2. Self-prescription
(1) Non-calculative imitation of policies of an authority.
(2) Non-calculative imitation of numerically dominant policy examples.
The next step involves assessing whether convergence=divergence has occurred in
the policies of the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium=Flanders 14 and consequently,
whether convergence=divergence (or neither) resulted from E.U. policies or from other
factors. Let us note however that the E.U. has promulgated very little legislation on
higher education. It has, however passed a variety of policy initiatives in the domain
of mobility. The most relevant were the action programmes COMMETT, ERASMUS,
SOCRATES and LEONARDO DA VINCI. 15 Also important for processes of conver-
gence in higher education systems and policies are the Sorbonne Declaration (1998)
and the Bologna Declaration (1999), even if the two declarations were not European
Union documents. The Sorbonne Declaration was an initiative taken by a number of
member states as their own (France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy). Sim-
ilarly, the Bologna Declaration was an initiative by states and some members of the
E.U., not others.
4. Developments in the Netherlands, Belgium=Flanders and Germany
Before the 1980s, the state was the major and indispensable actor in higher education
policies in the Netherlands, Flanders and Germany. Governmental authority, however,
did not play the same role in the higher education systems in these countries. In
the Netherlands and Belgium (until the federalization of the Belgian state in 1989),
authority lay in the hands of the central government whereas in Germany, the Lander
possessed the essential decision making power in higher education.
13 Imitation can be based on either a rational, calculative understanding of its bene4ts or on motivations that
cannot be reduced to rational calculation. The former type of imitation will be called “calculative imitation”,
the latter “non-calculative (or self-prescriptive) imitation”. One interesting example of calculative imitation
to which Guy Neave pointed in a conversation with me is the notion of perceived imitation as an element
of the law of anticipated results.
14 Again, acceptance of legislation does not necessarily imply its implementation.
15 For an overview and analysis of E.U. higher education policies and initiatives, see Van HeEen, Maassen,
Verhoeven, de Viilder, and de Wit (1999, pp. 165–184).
V. Rakic /Higher Education Policy 14 (2001) 225–240 233
Higher education in Belgium was heavily dependent on the delicate balance between
the diEerent language communities, as well as the diEerent ideological groups. Belgian
politics in general, and educational policy in particular, were inFuenced to a signi4cant
degree by political relationships and negotiation (Wielemans & Vanderhoeven, 1991,
p. 1). In 1959, a law was adopted splitting the education system into three networks:
• A public (state) network, the Minister of Education being the organizing authority.
• An oJcially subsidized network, organized by municipalities and provinces.
• A “free network”, run mainly by Catholic authorities (Wielemans & Vanderhoeven,
1991, p. 3).
Higher education in the Netherlands and Germany, were not characterized to the same
degree by this complicated ideological–political balance.
All three systems were imbued with the ideals of equality and equivalence, all
three faced the massi4cation of higher education during the 1960s. In the 1980s, the
three systems gradually switched from a policy of equality and equivalence to policies
grounded on institutional competition and on the quality of their services. In Belgium
and Germany, higher vocational schools were oJcially introduced in 1970 (Wielemans
& Vanderhoeven, 1991, pp. 2–3; Van de Maat, 1999, p. 17).
The problem the Netherlands faced in the 1970s, and which redirected it towards
more competition in the 1980s, turned around a high student drop-out rate, lengthy
study duration, insuJcient academic staE and ineJcient institutional management
(Goedegebuure et al., 1994, p. 190). A two-tier structure was introduced, in the late
1970s as was retrenchment measures which closed some departments and reshuPed
programs. Conditional funding for research was introduced (Boezerooy, 1999, p. 11).
In 1982, university funding ceased to be enrollment driven and became based on an
assessment of quality and social relevance. In place of block grants, universities had to
“earn” part of their budget (Goedegebuure et al., 1994, p. 199). In 1983, the Nether-
lands adopted a formal quality assurance system and a “conditional funding policy”
which entailed institutions obtaining more autonomy if they delivered quality education
(Boezerooy, 1999, pp. 50–51). In 1983, the Dutch Ministry of Education published the
White Paper “Scale Enlargement, Task-Reallocation and Concentration” (STC), which
envisioned mergers and set in the sector of vocational education the emergence of mul-
tidisciplinary, medium-sized institutions with considerable autonomy. This did indeed,
happen to a degree even the Ministry did not envisage (Goedegebuure et al., 1994, p. 191).
Developments in German higher education in the mid-1980s followed many Dutch
trends during the 4rst half. In 1983, the Federal Ministry of Education launched the idea
of more diEerentiation and competition (Frackmann & de Weert, 1993, p. 151). The
new 1985 Framework Act (Rahmengesetz) endowed higher education institutions with
even more autonomy than they had on the basis of its 1976 predecessor. (Frackmann
& de Weert, p. 143). The planning sections of the 1976 law were abolished in 1985
(Frackmann & de Weert, p. 143). Whilst the 1983 Act, allowed institutions to propose
new programs, 4nal authority vested with the state Ministry of Education. Final deci-
sions concerning curricula were within the institutions (Frackmann & de Weert, p. 143).
In 1985, the German Science Council (Wissenschaftsrat) following the recommenda-
tion of the Ministry of Education decided that diEerences in quality and performance
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should be made transparent and that funds should be allocated competitively (Frack-
mann & de Weert, p. 151), a decision which corresponded to the Dutch quality assur-
ance system and to the Dutch idea of “conditional funding” adopted in 1983. Changes
in German higher education in the mid-1980s were in line with similar developments
in Holland a few years before. These changes were best seen in the idea to establish
a higher education system more competitive, market-oriented, eJcient, in an increase
of institutional autonomy, as well as in the area of quality assurance and funding.
In Belgium as well, the relationship between government and higher education under-
went modi4cation in the mid-1980s. In 1986, the Saint-Ann austerity plan was adopted,
as well as a plan to rationalize the non-university sector, both being promulgated by
the Ministry of Education (Wielemans & Vanderhoeven 1991, p. 4).
The second half of the 1980s was unblemished by major developments in higher
education in any of the three countries, save one in Belgium, which went far be-
yond higher education. In 1989, the Belgian state was federalized and higher education
policies were almost completely transferred to the regions and language communities.
Research policies were somewhat less aEected (Wiehemans & Vanderhoeven, p. 2).
Local boards of administration were set up in non-university institutions of higher ed-
ucation (Wielemans & Vanderhoeven, p. 4). From this point our attention focuses on
Flemish higher education alone.
In the 1990s, higher education systems in the Netherlands and Flanders continued to
come together around a number of essential issues, though German higher education
did not witness major change (Frackmann & de Weert, 1993, p. 160).
In 1990, higher vocational (HBO) institutions in the Netherlands launched further
contract research (Boezerooy, 1999, p. 19). The HOOP document of 1992 recognizing
skills shortages in Europe identi4ed in the report by the advisory Committee of the
European Commission (IRDAC, 1991), took up its most important recommendations.
These included an increase in graduates in science and technology, more investment
in recurrent education and improvement of the productivity of education systems. This
policy stance also emerged in the ministerial budget statements of 1992 and 1993. The
Higher Education and Research Act of 1993 (based on the 1985 government paper
HOAK) extended institutional autonomy and governmental non-intervention (IRDAC,
1991, p. 13). Institutions gained substantial freedom of course development. Now, the
Minister had to prove that a new program would be detrimental to eJcient course
provision. Previously, the burden of proof had been on the institutions. The quality of
new courses was judged ex post (Goedegebuure et al., 1994, p. 1998). The quality
assessment system expanded considerably in the 1990s based both on self-evaluation
and external review and audit (the Inspectorate of Higher Education, peer review)
(Goedegebuure et al., 1994, p. 208). Dutch higher education was funded from three
sources: directly from the Ministry (some 73%), from the Dutch Research Council
(some 5%) and from contract research (recently estimated 15% for Universities and
8% for HBO). Contract research funding is on the increase (Boezerooy, 1999, p. 31).
Tuition fees are also required and is the same for Universities and the HBO sector
(Boezerooy, 1999, p. 31). Since 1999 the speci4c Dutch system of place allocation
is also under revision: students with 8.00 or more as their grade point average are
automatically admitted to the University programs of their choice (Boezerooy, 1999,
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p. 20). Finally, debate proceeds about adopting the (Anglo-Saxon) pattern of a BA=MA
degree structure (Kamerman, 1999).
In Flanders a governmental decree was issued in 1991, granting vocational education
(HOBU) much larger autonomy, whilst less central regulation and more “steering from
a distance” was prescribed for Universities (Beverwijk, 1999, p. 33). The 1991 decree
dealt in detail with quality assurance. The Flanders Inter-University Council (V.L.I.R.)
was made responsible for coordinating quality assurance, based on internal and exter-
nal control (external control through peer review and without government intervention.
The V.L.I.R. cooperated closely with its Netherlands counterpart (the V.S.N.U.) and
used its reports as a guideline (Beverwijk, 1999, p. 45). 16 The decree altered the
structure of academic personnel substantially, aligning it on the Dutch or US model
(assistant professor–associate professor–full professor). Changes in Flemish higher edu-
cation during the 1990s reduced government involvement (including cuts in government
subsidies (Wielemans, & Vanderhoeven, 1991, p. 10)) and more competition. Leaving
these general trends aside, convergence with the Dutch system took place within the
sphere of quality assurance, entrance requirements, and possibly within the structure of
higher education (serious discussions took place in the Netherlands about adopting the
BA=MA degree structure which already existed in Flanders.
German higher education, though converging towards the Dutch and Belgian=Flemish
in the 1980s, did not change substantially in the 1990s and is distinguished from the
two Benelux countries by its speci4c federal structure and decentralized authority, its
insistence of the primacy of equality and equivalence (something which in Belgium
is assumed in light of its speci4c ideological–political balance, but is being gradually
removed), the absence of tuition fees (Van de Maat, 1999, p. 42), its open access
policies to Universities (at least in principle) (Frackmann & de Weert, 1993, p. 135),
as well as the absence of a national quality assessment system (Van de Maat, 1999,
p. 47). Yet, the Conference of University Rectors and Presidents adopted a resolution
in 1995 on the assessment of teaching (both internal and external assessment), and in
1997 consultations at Lander level and at inter-regional level produced the principle of
a national quality assessment system (Van de Maat, 1999, p. 47). Further trend in the
direction of convergence is the increasing signi4cance of funding higher education by
the private sector (Van de Maat, 1999, p. 40).
In conclusion, convergence in the higher education sectors of Germany, the Nether-
lands and Belgium=Flanders is evident during the 1980s and 1990s though in the latter
period clearly less pronounced in Germany), however, the role of the European Union
was minor. Speci4cally, the European Union adopted very little legislation that forced
any of the three countries to change their higher education systems. 17 E.U. higher
education policies hardly had any direct impact on those of the three member states.
The only exception was mobility, stimulated by the E.U. through a variety of action
programs (COMMETT, ERASMUS, SOCRATES, LEONARDO DA VINCI, etc.). In
16 In fact, the V.L.I.R. was an earlier form of the Flemish Rectors Conference, and had little to do with
quality assurance until 1991.
17 The Gravier case, however, did have an impact on Belgium, because Belgian authorities were not allowed
anymore to charge diEerential fees to European students.
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terms of indirect impact, these action programs introduced changes in the structure
of higher education systems (e.g., the convenience of having similar BA=MA degree
structures may stimulate the appropriate institutional changes), and in the domain of
quality assurance (e.g., similar quality assurance criteria among the member states will
positively inFuence student mobility).
Convergence in the higher education policies of the Netherlands, Belgium=Flanders
and Germany may certainly be explained by authorities imitating each other. Behind
this imitation, however, appears to be self-interest. Governments judge what trends will
dominate in Europe of the future and generally try to keep pace. In that sense, the
E.U. is an integrating factor and member state authorities are generally aware that,
even if not directly coerced into a particular policy by the E.U., major deviation from
the dominant trend will be detrimental to their country. Signi4cantly recent important
documents in the 4eld of higher education were initiated from bottom-up by member
states: The Sorbonne Declaration and the Bologna Declaration, both aim to harmonize
higher education policies in a number of essential domains. 18 Again, the E.U. played
the central role.
In sum, a preliminary assessment would conclude that convergence in the higher
education policies of the Netherlands, Belgium=Flanders and Germany did occur in
the 1980s and 1990s, but that the direct role of the E.U. in the processes involved
in convergence is minimal. Indirectly however, E.U. policies had an impact. Thus, the
motives dominating convergence lie in bene4ts to be had from E.U. policies, and in the
calculative and possibly non-calculative imitation of each other’s policies by member
states. 19
5. Link to theories of institutional isomorphism
That government institutions imitate each other’s policies, brings us to the literature
on institutions in general, and more particularly to literature on institutional isomor-
phism. Two important studies are worth further attention:
(1) DiMaggio and Powell’s The Iron Cage Revisited. Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields (1983), takes the view that, rational
actors make their institutions increasingly similar, while attempting to change them.
This form of convergence rests on three isomorphic processes: coercive, mimetic
and normative (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 147). Coercive isomorphism follows
from formal and informal pressures on one organization by another which is depen-
dent upon it and by “cultural expectations in the society within which organizations
function” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150). Mimetic isomorphism is fed by un-
certainty: “when organizational technologies are poorly understood, when goals are
ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty” (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983, p. 151). Normative isomorphic change is a consequence of profes-
18 “Bottom-up initialization” does not refer initiatives by higher education institutions, but by E.U. member
states.
19 These three motives are classi4ed under A2a, A2d, B1 and B2 in the “general scheme”.
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sionalization, i.e. of “the collective struggle of members of an occupation to de4ne
the conditions and methods of their work” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 152). 20
Two major diEerences emerge from the “general scheme” presented earlier and
DiMaggio and Powell’s theory. First, the “general scheme” deals with reasons for
convergence, whereas DiMaggio and Powell posit mechanisms of convergence. Sec-
ond, DiMaggio and Powell address exclusively rational mechanisms, while non-rational
(or rather non-calculative, to avoid confusion with “irrational”) mechanisms may also
lead to certain policy outcomes, including the direction of institutional change (e.g.,
fashion). Thus, “calculative imitation” as presented in the general scheme can be a mo-
tivational underpinning for all three types of isomorphic processes as DiMaggio and
Powell identify.
(2) Scott’s Institutions and Organizations (1995): also subscribes to DiMaggio and
Powell’s three mechanisms of isomorphic change, but regards them as elements of
three pillars of institutions as well (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 35). He diEeren-
tiates between the regulative, normative and cognitive pillars. The regulative pillar
includes rule-setting, monitoring and sanctioning activities (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983, p. 35). The normative pillar relates to rules that introduce a prescriptive,
evaluative and obligatory dimension into social life. Scott argued: “Actors conform
not because it serves their individual interests, narrowly de4ned, but because it is
expected of them; they are obliged to do so” (Scott, 1995, p. 39). The cognitive
pillar emphasizes stabilizing eEects of shared de4nitions of social reality (Scott,
1995, p. 40). 21
However, the normative and cognitive pillars do not diEer greatly from each other.
Both pertain to a particular moral obligation, with the diEerence that “cognitivists”
tend not to attach an absolute (or even objective) value to their morality. In that
sense, the cognitive pillar can be regarded as a relativized normative pillar. In contrast
to the normative and cognitive pillar, the regulative pillar does not pertain to moral
obligation, but to a more coercive element in obligation. Thus, the regulative pillar
stimulates compliance on the basis of self-interest, the normative and cognitive pillars
do so also but on the basis of what may be called ‘self-prescription’.
One of the central questions is whether or not the “behavior” of institutions is pri-
marily rational. DiMaggio and Powell insist on the rationality of actors, whereas Scott
leaves more room for self-prescriptive behavior. March and Olsen (1989) make a
distinction between “aggregative theories” and “integrative theories”. Aggregative the-
ories are based on rationality and exchange, 22 whereas integrative theories “commonly
20 The authors note that universities and professional training institutions are important for the development
of organizational norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 152). Normative isomorphism may, therefore, be
an important explanatory mechanism in research on the impact of academic institutions and disciplines on
national (and supranational) policy making in the 4eld of higher education.
21 The three pillars are identi4ed as “making up or supporting institutions” (Scott, 1995, p. 35).
22 Examples of aggregative (rational choice) institutional theories include North and Thomas (1973), whose
economic theory emphasizes institutions as mechanisms for lowering transaction costs, as well as theories in
the 4eld of political science which regard voters as customers (see the works of Moe, Shepsle and Weingast).
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presume an order based on history, obligation, and reason” (March & Olsen, P. 118).
March and Olsen follow the tradition of integrative theories: “In a broad sense, we
have been urging that a perspective of politics as organized around the interactions
of a collection of individual actors or events be supplemented with (or replaced by)
a perspective that sees the polity as a community of rules, norms, and institutions”
(March & Olsen, p. 171). 23
Mimetic processes are not always rational processes. Hence, reasons for convergence
or divergence of policies are not sought exclusively in the purely calculative behavior
of actors. It may be true, however, that the behavior of political actors is more guided
by self-interest (and is thus more calculative) than the behavior of many other societal
actors. The accuracy of this assumption, however, is not certain.
In conclusion, higher education policies in the Netherlands, Belgium=Flanders and
Germany did converge in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in the domain of mobility.
In all three systems, mechanisms of quality assurance developed (though not identi-
cal ones). As for the structure of higher education, the trend of convergence is less
pronounced.
The direct role of the E.U. in these processes of convergence is indirect only in the
sphere of mobility. Its indirect role can be detected in other domains. For instance,
increased student mobility in the E.U. has an impact on the development of similar
programs or similar degree structures in member states, and on the development of
comparable quality assurance mechanisms. Here, calculative imitation of each other’s
policy by member states stands as the dominant mechanism of institutional isomor-
phism. In addition to calculative imitation, it is possible that non-calculative motives
fuel imitation, i.e. that policy makers in one state imitate the policies of others on
the basis of moral authority or shear size, rather than on grounds of pure calculation.
Thus, it is a (soft) form of coercion by the E.U. which brings about convergence in
the domain of mobility (with eEects on other domains), and calculative (and possibly
also non-calculative) imitation of policy examples that results in convergence in quality
assurance and the structure of higher education systems in the three member states.
Behind this calculative (and possibly also non-calculative) imitation of policy ex-
amples lies the “law of anticipated results”: Policy makers adjust their policies to the
situation they anticipate, in this case, to a slow but steady process of Europeaniza-
tion. However, both Europeanization and globalization imply increasing competition.
A shift toward the principles of competition is clearly visible in higher education in
the Netherlands, Belgium=Flanders and Germany. Higher education institutions become
more autonomous, more subjected to competition and “natural selection”, while the
role of the governments becomes less central. A decrease of government involvement
in higher education, observed in all three states, appears to be the dominant dimension
in policy convergence.
23 A useful classi4cation of institutional dynamics in the international political context can be found in
March and Olsen (1998). The authors distinguish two central issues that divide students of international
relations and other organized systems: the basic logic of action that determines human behavior and the
issue concerning the eJciency of history. It appears possible to classify aggregative and integrative theorists
as well on the basis of their approaches to these two issues.
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Why convergence in the higher education systems of these three countries is on the
increase are the last 20 years, while absent previously has to be explained. Certainly,
the policies of the E.U. contributes signi4cantly. The economic crisis of the 1970s
and 1980s reiterated the drive of higher education toward the market. 24 Since this
orientation became dominant across the European Union, developments resulting from
it accentuated the push toward convergence in a number of domains in member states
higher education systems. Convergence is both the consequences of a massi4cation in
higher education in Western Europe, as well the outcome of the increasing place of the
E.U. in higher education. This, together with the steady progress of Europeanization
and globalization, tipped a number of developments in the direction of convergence
during these gears. Such developments were strengthened by calculative and possibly
also by non-calculative imitation of policy examples.
In conclusion, convergence is emerging in the policies of E.U. member states, ap-
pears to be con4rmed to some degree in the higher education sector (at least in the
three countries analyzed). Whether convergence is a product of European integration,
globalization or institutional isomorphism is not particularly relevant. Europeanization
and globalization, have arguably the same eEect on convergence=divergence, both as-
sist a convergence based on increased competition and “natural selection”. Related
to institutional isomorphism, they create an increasingly homogenous environment in
which imitation mechanisms (within member state policies, and within higher educa-
tion institutions) become more active. Hence, Europeanization, globalization and insti-
tutional isomorphism are related processes leading to convergence with these policy
4elds examined here. Neither these mechanisms nor a direct impact of E.U. policies
which account for the observed changes, can be answered brieFy. Despite some di-
rect eEects of E.U. policies (especially in the area of student and teacher mobility),
changes in higher education policies are mainly inFuenced by indirect mechanisms re-
lated to European integration, of which one of the essential is based on institutional
isomorphism.
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